INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Nigeria is richly endowed with both energy and human resources; is the largest oil producer in Africa, holds the largest natural gas reserves on the continent (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). With proven oil reserves of over 37 billion barrels and over 124 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, at current rate of 2 million barrels production per day, the oil reserves is expected to last between 40 to 45 years. During the last four decades Nigeria generated hundreds of billions of dollars from exports of oil. Yet, instead of turning Nigeria into one of the most prosperous states on the African continent, these natural resources have only enriched a small minority while the vast majority have become increasingly impoverished: with a per capita gross national product of only U.S. $260 a year, Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in the world (Human Right Watch, 1999).
Recently, some commentators suggest that more than half of the oil revenues were mismanaged by the successive governments in Nigeria. Earlier the IMF suggests that the $700 billion in oil revenues since 1960 have added almost nothing to the standard of living of the average Nigerian (IMF, 2011). More recently, the World Bank's ex-vice-president for Africa, Oby Ezekwesili said over $400bn -estimated amount of Nigeria's oil revenue were misspent since independence in 1960. So many studies suggest that billions of oil revenues did not have any impact on the wellbeing of the population of the country; the World Bank suggest that over 70 percent of the population are living below $1.00 a day and over 80 percent of the oil revenues goes to less than 1 percent of the population.
The country is also richly endowed with human resources as well, with a population of close to 170 million people, larger than any country on the continent. Undoubtedly, the size of Nigeria"s population is a potential for human capital, if properly exploited, Nigeria in abundance both semiskilled and unskilled labour. In his speech when he visited Nigeria, President Clinton stressed the importance of Nigeria"s human and natural resource, and how their revitalization can be an economic and political anchor of West Africa (Sachs and Warner, 2001 ).
Before 1970s oil boom, Nigeria was a medium size developing country with a population of about 58 million that relied on exports of primary products for its revenues and exports earnings. During that period, over 60 percent of the country"s GDP and exports earning were derived from agriculture, while oil was contributing less than 10 percent. As at that time, Nigerian economy was at par with some middle income developing and low income OECD countries. 1 However, the Nigeria"s real GDP in early 1970s was even far ahead of countries like Malaysia, Egypt, Thailand and Hungary 2 . By 2011, most of these countries surpassed Nigeria in real GDP growth and all human development indicators, despite billions of dollars generated through oil revenues 3 .
Since oil boom era of 1970s, oil has assumed a major role in Nigerian economic and political decisions; it generates a host of expectations among the citizenry and the government in Nigeria, it creates an illusion that completely changed life in Nigerians, life without work, life for free…. The concept of oil expresses perfectly the external human dream of wealth achieved through lucky accident…. In this sense oil is a fairy tale and like every fairy tale a bit of a lie (Quoted in Watts 2006) . Although "sowing the seed of oil" to diversify the economy has been a longstanding goal for many mineral exporters in developing countries such as Botswana, Indonesia, Malaysia and United Arab Emirates. Oil wealth opens up opportunities for Nigeria to become less dependent on it, by diversifying its economy through investment in other sectors, building a high quality human capital and infrastructure, strong non-oil exports and vibrant manufacturing sector to become strongest economy in Africa and competing with some East Asian and OECD countries in international exports market for manufactured and other high-tech goods as well as non-oil primary products.
However, Nigeria misused this golden opportunity; as a result of that it has had a turbulent and disappointing development record and remains significantly oil-dependent. Most of the economic and political decisions are influenced by oil sector; national budgets are tagged on the vagaries of international oil prices and loans are contracted in anticipation of revenues from oil sales and big projects are embarked upon in expectation of rise in oil revenues.
Regrettably, what looks like blessings turns to rather a "curse". With massive oil revenues it was expected that the country should have formulated a strategy for the development of the nonhydrocarbon economy (to generate tax revenues, employment and exports) and a buffer between hydrocarbon revenues and the continuing and more stable revenue needs of the government. those strategies were not adopted in the 1970s, by 1980s with crunch in the international oil prices, the oil revenue became insufficient to counter the problems in the country such as increased in budget deficit, unemployment and a decline in living standards, which ultimately eroded the socio-political contract and cause dissent within society.
Over the years Nigeria not only frittered away the opportunities offered to turnaround the economy with the huge revenue generated from oil, but in fact induced further distress. For instance, rather than work to secure the country"s future by investing in non-oil economic development in 1973; with its potential for non-oil sources of revenue, Nigeria"s excess oil revenue went into massive state-funded unproductive expenditures 4 , outflows of capital on public account, large scale contract awards and white elephant projects (e.g. the Udoji Award, Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Mills and FESTAC-World Black & African Festival of Arts and Culture). Furthermore, Nigeria embarked on massive importation of all sorts of consumables from countries like China, India and Taiwan, which, because they were cheap, at the end of the day undermined local production, since those imported goods are cheaper than locally produced goods. By 1980, when the oil boom receded, volumes of imports and expenditure reached unsustainable levels. However, since government did not invest oil money in a stabilization fund or diversify the nonoil exports, some factors such as currency appreciation and domestic inflation made local industries and agriculture uncompetitive internationally and boosted imports, leading to balance of payments difficulties during oil-induced recessions in 1978-79 and from 1981 until the early 1990s.
The oil revenue also promoted endemic and wholesale corruption, since 1996 Nigeria"s rating in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index has been on decline (Transparency International, 2014). According to IMF most of the corruptions in the country are centred in around the oil industry and its revenues; through rent-seeking behaviour direct mismanagement of the treasury by government officials and oil theft from pipelines and export terminals through the connivance between host communities and law enforcement agents.
Finally, since late 1960s, oil continued to play a prominent role in both internal politics and Nigeria"s external diplomacy, in fact, the discovery of oil and of course the growing importance of oil in the Nigerian economy, adds economic dimension to the political mistrust. According to Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), the Biafran War of the late 1960s was in part an attempt by the eastern, predominantly Ibo region, to gain control over oil reserves. Similarly, the current crisis in the oil producing region of Nigeria is more or less motivated by the anticipated economic gains from oil. Evidence from kidnappings and escalating rates of oil theft are indicators In Nigeria today, the scramble for political power among the regions are motivated more by the desire to control the oil resources more than political power itself. Similarly, scramble for oil wealth by the Multinational Companies and the Nigerian government led to so many cases of human right violations in the oil producing areas; there are so many cases of human right abuses during both military and civilian governments meted against the Niger Delta activist. The two most notable are the hanging of Ken SaroWiwa, an environmental activist from Ogoni land in 1995 by Late General Abacha and the Odi Massacre in November 1999, by the Nigerian military, it was reported that nearly 2500 civilians were killed in that incidence (the massacre was done during civilian government) (Bassey, 2006) . This brief introduction immediately suggests a classification of issues. An important question is whether Nigeria"s heavy dependence on oil "matters". There are several reasons for concern. The first is essentially about oil being exhaustible resource. The issue of continuous Continuous over dependence on one resource is a signal that the economy is not likely to be sustainable in the near future. Thus there would be substantial benefits from diversifying the economy and less reliance on oil as the only source of income for the country. The primary objective of this study is to answer some basic research question such as; what accounts for the continuing overdependence on oil in Nigeria since 1970s? Is this trend likely to continue? What are the consequences of the over dependence on this exhaustible resource?
Sections 2 tries to explain what accounts for the low level of performance of the oil and other nonoil sectors, section 3 consider these two, very different, sets of issues; the performance of the Nigerian economy from 1970s to 2011 and review of literature on Dutch dieses and resource curse. Section 4 is the econometric model and data estimation. Section 5, concludes from the result.
BACKGROUND
The dismal performance of Nigeria in economic growth and welfare during the last four decades is paradoxical because human and natural resource endowment have been the source of growth of many developed countries. The biggest global economy is the United State, arguably, most of its growth since industrial revolution can be attributed to its human and natural resource endowments. Other large economies such as China and India have their human resource contribute more in their performance than natural resources.
Interestingly, a study by Habakkuk (1962) argued that greater natural resource endowment was among the factors why USA surpassed England in the 19 th Century. Similarly, North (1963) , argues that abundant natural resources have been regarded as contributing to successful development and have provided an explanation for the growth of Western countries, such as Australia, the U.S. and Canada. Furthermore, Lal and Myint (1996) argue that successful countries tend to have developmental political states that have two defining characteristics, namely sufficient autonomy to pursue a coherently, sound economic policy and the goal of maximising social welfare in a sustainable manner.
Arguably therefore, abundance of natural resources provides a source of foreign exchange for importation of capital goods. It is also a source of raw materials for processing and market for manufactured inputs for both domestic and foreign markets. Similarly, it also attracts highly skilled foreign manpower to work in both manufacturing and resource based industries. Similarly, large population means abundance of cheap semi-skilled and unskilled labour to work in both manufacturing and agriculture. Furthermore, income generated by the population is a means of effective demand for output from other sectors. Finally, abundance of resources could also be used for human capital and infrastructural development for highly skilled and specialized labour force and improvement of social welfare of the entire population. Looking at the experience of those countries; what would have been the source of its strength has become a nightmare for Nigeria. This section reviews some indicators for structural changes in Nigeria. The trends in the share of agriculture to real GDP as shown in figure 1 suggest that in 1960s on average agriculture was contributing about 67 percent on average, however, the contribution of the sector maintained declining trends with little swings in some decades. Before 1970, the average annual growth of agriculture was about 15%, however, the surge in oil revenues during the two global oil shocks resulted in large inflows of revenues. Perceiving that the revenues would be sustained, the Nigerian government totally neglected agriculture, the government also maintained a very high exchange rate which apparently appreciated more than all its trading partners, which rendered both agriculture and manufacturing goods in Nigeria less competitive.
Since early 1980s the Nigerian economy started showing some signs of crumbling. However, successive governments did little to arrest the situation. During that period, a combination of relatively static oil revenues and rising demand for government spending led to chronic budgetary deficits in Nigeria. Until 1986, when the situation became unsustainable, the Nigerian government approached the IMF and World Bank for adjustment lending. However, Nigeria was forced to embark on economic reform programs to qualify for assistance from those multilateral organizations. Nigeria was forced to swallow bitter pills by embarking on Structural Adjustment Programme(SAP) including, fiscal discipline; such as tax reforms; drastic reduction in government spending and directing public expenditure towards infrastructure and public services rather than industrial activity; privatization of state industries; banking reform, including liberalizing interest rates; deregulation of markets; competitive exchange rates; trade liberalization and opening up to foreign direct investment; and securing property rights.
As at the time the SAP was introduced, the nominal exchange rate between Nigerian Naira and US dollar was N0.70 Naira to US$1.00, however, Naira was at par with Sterling Pound. Fiscal deficits was more than 10 percent of the real GDP and ratio of external debts service as a percentage of exports of goods and services was about 32.78 percent.. Similarly, there was a policy failure, although government tried to introduce some policies and programmes to promote agricultural production, but those policies were neither sustained nor pursued vigorously. For example, the same green revolution programme that was attempted in Nigeria in the 1980s was also implemented by Indonesia. Indonesian case was a success story and that of Nigeria was a complete failure. So many similar policies and programmes attempted by Nigeria to promote agricultural productivity programmes such as Operation Feed the Nation, Green Revolution and Operation Back to Land. So many River Basin Development Authorities and World Bank financed Agricultural Development Projects were embarked-on. However, all those policies were not implemented vigorously. In fact on the one hand government was perusing some policies to promote agriculture, on the other hand, with the large oil revenues and high values of exchange rate, all sorts of agricultural products were either legally imported or smuggled into the country through its neighbours.
An example was that during the 1979 to 1983, the NPN led civilian government had a special programme for importation of rice, the Minster for Transport was appointed the chairman of Rice Importation Committee.
A source of concern about the large influx of oil revenue created an illusion in the minds of people, this led to large scale of rural urban migration, many youngsters that were engaged in farming profession in the rural areas moved to urban areas in search for wage employments in manufacturing, mining, construction and services. This factor led to crowding out of labour from agriculture; this led to a large decline in the level of agricultural labour as well as its productivity. By 1996, agriculture accounted for only 2 per cent of Nigeria"s exports.
As agricultural exports shrank, Nigeria became a net importer of some commodities that it formerly exported. For example, between 1970and 1982, Nigeria lost over 96.6 per cent of her exports in nominal terms. Domestic food production also declined substantially, causing the food import bill to attain a high of about $4billion in 1982. The astronomical increase in imports was financed by oil revenues, which ensured positive current account balances in1979 and 1980.
Despite an attempt in 1986 to promote exports based industrialisation through the Structural Adjustment Programme. The Dutch disease had already set-in. notwithstanding emphasis on diversifying Nigeria"s export base away from oil and increasing non-oil foreign exchange earnings though policies like devaluation and trade liberalization, the Nigerian economy did not show resilience in this respect. Therefore, the productivity of agricultural sector rather continued to decline.
The industrial sector is expected to be the engine of growth for the Nigerian economy to attain her aspiration of being among largest economies in world. Since its independence, successive governments in Nigeria have pursued different policies to promote industrialisation which was expected to be a pivotal to economic growth and development of the country. The second and third National Development Plans coincided with the first and second oil booms, the surge in the oil revenues motivated the government to plan its imports substitution industrialisation policies based on the illusion that revenues from oil would continue to finance future industrial developments. During that period government embarked on establishment of industries irrespective of their relevance, however, the government made sure that those industries were highly protected against foreign competition.
In principle, the import substituting industries were established as public corporations; not necessarily to make profits, but among other things, were to provide employments and cheap products to the public. Adejugbe (1980), argues that Nigeria"s industrial policies, objectives, and strategies are often subject to modifications, neglect or even total abandonment. He further opined that industrial policies and practice in Nigeria have been pursued on ad-hoc basis and in a most uncoordinated manner. Ajayi (2007) in describing the trend in industrial output in Nigeria observed that there is no significant relationship between the volume of production subcontracting, the size and structural characteristics of contracting firms. He observed that industrial production subcontractors were spatially dispersed in the country. The disparity in the distribution of manufacturing activities has often explained the reason for the dismal performance of the sector. He thus emphasized the need for the valorisation of raw agricultural products or the treatment of raw materials for export, or through the principle of import substitution adopted by the Nigerian governments as their industrial planning strategy.
There are some empirical cross country studies that tries to link the performance of manufacturing sectors with oil industry, Jiranyakul (2006) emphasised that a rise in oil price affected supply of the petroleum product, (especially for oil import dependent countries) and hence makes it more costly for firms to produce goods since energy and capital are complemented. This implies that firms that uses more of refined petroleum product experience higher cost of running their machines except they purchase new energy-efficient machines. The profit of firms stuck with less fuel-efficient machines suffers, and they may alternatively invest in labour intensive method of production, which of course has a backward production effect on the firms. In Nigeria, energy prices are highly subsidized, however, electricity supply has been very inefficient and unreliable leading to frequent Power outages forced industries to provide generators as either substitute or complement to the unreliable power supply from Power Holdings Company of Nigeria. By this, industries have to incur additional cost of production; which are factored into the general cost of production; this therefore rising significantly the operating cost for the manufacturing firms in the country which affected their performances significantly.
Additionally, high relative exchange rate between Nigeria"s currency vis a vis its neighbours make exports market for Nigeria"s manufactured goods in African market less competitive. Therefore, those factors led to dismal performance of the sector over the years. From the table, the contribution of manufacturing sector value added to the real GDP in Nigeria has never reached up to 6 percent, and it maintained a declining trend since oil boom. Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that positive wealth shock from the natural resource sector (along with consumer preferences that translate this into higher demand for non-traded goods) creates excess demand for non-traded products and drives up non-traded prices, including particularly non-traded input costs and wages. This in turn squeezes profits in tradedactivities such as manufacturing that use those non-traded products as inputs yet sell their products on international markets at relatively fixed international prices. The decline in manufacturing then has ramifications that grind the growth process to a halt. The contribution of manufacturing sector in real GDP, as depicted in figure 2 , (manufacturing in right scale) has never exceeded one digit throughout the period of the study. In 1960, the contribution of manufacturing to real GDP was 6.12 percent (even more than oil that was less than 3 percent). However, it maintained a declining trend throughout the period. It was only in 1980s it recorded a growth of 9.87 percent. Although the trends in agriculture may suggest a Dutch disease effects, however, there is no evidence to suggest that growth in oil sector or high exchange rate value crowded out investment in manufacturing sector in favour of oil sector. Natural resource intensity measured by contributions of natural resource rents as a share of GDP in Nigeria is shown in figure 3 . The trends suggest that there are some degree, but not perfect correlation between natural resource rents and real GDP; they are exhibiting the same trends. This suggests how highly dependent Nigeria is on oil. Two significant things to note in the movement of contribution of natural resource rent to GDP is the volatility of the natural resource rents and how the recent crisis in the oil sector affected its contribution to GDP. It can be observed from 2006 onwards, due to crisis in the oil producing area. The share of natural resource rents are declining, so also the nominal GDP is also not performing quite well. There are so many augments against over reliance on oil revenues by oil producing countries. One of the augments is that because the international oil prices are so volatile, any disruption or fluctuations in the international oil markets would have negative impact on the economic performance of an oil dependent country. Figure 3 shows how the movements in the international oil prices affected the contribution of oil rents to GDP. The discovery of oil, gas or any other valuable commodity has long been considered a mixed blessing, particularly for Nigeria. Rather than fostering economic growth and development, resources are often pocketed or wasted by corrupt and inept government officials, promoting
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) Oil Prices unrest and conflict among impoverished citizens who fail to see any rewards from these sudden riches.
Consequently, one of the widely believed reasons for the dismal performance of many resource rich developing countries is attributed to corruption in the management of proceeds generated from exports of such resources. The most widely used variable to capture the effect of corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of which corruption is seen by business people. A ranking of ten (10) points suggest that a country is totally corruption-free country. However, an point 1 or 1.2 suggest that the country is extremely corrupt (the available data from TI starts from 1998). From the figure 5, Nigeria has been at the bottom between 1.0 and 2.7 points; suggesting that the country has been among the most corrupt countries in the world. When Nigeria"s ranking is compared to other developing Sub-Saharan countries, interestingly, Nigeria has been lagging far behind some of its poorer neighbours. For example, in 2013 ranking, while Nigeria was scored 2.5, Ghana was 4.6, Niger and Algeria 3.4 and South Africa and Botswana scored 4.2 and 6.4 respectively.
Corruption generally in resource rich developing countries tends to allow inefficient producers to remain in business, encourages governments to pursue perverse economic policies, and provides opportunities to bureaucrats and politicians to enrich themselves through extorting bribes from those seeking government favours. Thus, corruption distorts economic incentives, discourages entrepreneurship, and slows economic growth (Mbaku 1992 , Gould 1980 . So many works have been done on how corruption can discourage investment, particularly, Foreign Direct Investment. Corruption has a negative impact on the level of investment and economic growth , on the quality of infrastructure and on the productivity of public investment (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997), and on income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 1998; Li, Xu, and Zou 2000).
Arguably there are so many gains a country may get in FDI, but corruption tends to hinder those gains. For instance, FDI add to gross capital formation and the balance of payments without the risk associated with additional loan repayments, but also it is often said to increase competition and give rise to positive technological externalities and spill over, thereby raising dynamic efficiency in the industry (Gastanaga et al.1998 ). FDI also gives developing countries cheap access to new technologies and skills thereby enhancing local technological capabilities and their ability to compete on world markets (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998) .Arguably corruption tends to hinder all those advantages. 
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
The study on impact of oil revenues on the long run growth performance of oil-rich developing countries mostly focused on the disappointing performances of many oil rich countries in their long term growth and human development indices. Most literature used the so-called Dutch disease thesis named after the experience of the Netherlands in the 1960s. This theoretical framework is widely used by researchers to empirically test whether natural resources are curse or blessings to countries. Majority of empirical findings proved that most of the oil-rich countries performed badly in terms of long run growth. The poor performance where linked to problems such as policy inconsistencies and failures that were influenced by unexpected surge in oil revenues accrued to those countries.
Consequently, many studies have concluded that resource abundance is more of a ""curse"" than blessings for those economies, and a growing literature seeks to identify the way in which natural resource exploitation crowds out growth promoting Institutions, investments or productive activities which in turn reduces welfare by lowering long run income levels. Several cross-country studies on resource-rich developing countries provided starling evidence that most resource-rich countries experienced relatively slower rate of growth over the past several decades (Nankani, 1979; Gelb et al.1988 ; Auty, 1986 Auty, , 1993 Sachs and Warner, 1995 A study by Sachs and Warner (2001) , proved that almost all resource abundant countries have stagnated in economic growth since early 1970s; in fact countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela have not experienced sustained economic growth. This is suggesting that they suffered from "curse of natural resource". Furthermore, the study concludes that those countries tended to be high price economies and that, partly because they tended to miss-out on exports led growth.
Evidence on the role of sound policies in mitigating against possible Dutch -Disease or resource course in resource rich countries, a comparative study of Botswana and Saudi Arabia by , the study showed how Botswana government was able to pursue coherently sound economic policy and goal of maximizing social welfare in a sustainable manner. Similarly, the country has high level of transparency in public revenue management achieving a corruption perception index at par with many OECD countries. The country successfully deployed its rents generated from diamond trade into more productive investment and escaped from a Dutch Disease. Conversely, Saudi Arabia pursued a less autonomous policy formulation to satisfy two pressing objectives; its role as a swing producer among OPEC member countries and cultural pressure for a paternalistic deployment of oil rent. The study shows that the Saudi Arabia government"s paternalistic deployment of oil rents led to accumulation of so many unsustainable welfare commitments during oil booms and reacted slowly during the decline in oil revenues. Similarly, volatility of Saudi Arabia"s revenue base also helped to slow down its performance. Evidence from the study suggests that Botswana by far out-performed Saudi Arabia in economic management during the study period, despite the fact that the latter had more access to revenues.
An outstanding research on the natural resource curse in Nigeria was conducted by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2012), illustrate waste and poor institutional quality stemming from oil rather than Dutch disease contributed to poor growth in post-independence Nigeria. Two evidence of waste are rapid accumulation of physical capital through public spending financed by surging oil revenues and poor capacity utilisation in the largely state-owned manufacturing sector, which turns out to be a colossal waste. The authors proffer a solution to the Nigeria"s current oil money induced problem by distributing the oil wealth equitably among the citizens. Then whenever there is a need for developmental project the government should tax the citizens. The authors conclude that problem of Nigeria is not related to Dutch disease.
According to Collier (2007) , resource wealth sometimes contributes to a conflict trap and the surplus from natural resource exports reduces growth. He goes on to discuss the case of Nigeria in the 1970s, when other exports of the country like agriculture became non-profitable due to increase oil revenues. He explains how the Dutch Disease can damage the growth process by closing out on the exports in other promising sectors of the economy. The first half of the 1980s gave rise to a huge oil boom in Nigeria and also led to excessive government borrowing and investment on wasteful projects that made the corruption in the country more apparent. As the world price of oil crashed in 1986, Nigeria"s oil revenues reduced drastically and Nigeria"s external debt increased drastically.
Fardmanesh (1991), tested the empirical evidence of Dutch disease in five oil depended economies of Algeria, Indonesia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Nigeria. Empirical evidence suggests that influx of oil revenues altered the output composition of those countries by contracting their agricultural sectors but expanding their non-traded goods and manufacturing sectors. This result to some extent contradicts one of the two assumptions of the Dutch disease thesis that resources booms tend to cause resource-movements effects from manufacturing and perhaps, agriculture to booming sector. Because the finding suggests that manufacturing sector output expanded during the study period. However, spending effects might not be ruled out. A study by Sala-i-Martina and Subramanian illustrates how accumulated physical capital through public spending, although it was shown that the investment was a colossal loss. However, for Indonesia, many studies suggested that Indonesia deployed its oil revenue windfall to expand its manufacturing sector.
Mikesell (1998), explore the likely reasons for resource-curse in some mineral exporting developing countries. The authors reviewed most of the current views of researcher about the likely cause of resource-curse in mineral exporting countries. The findings from the research suggest that there is no single factor that can account for the dismal growth failure in mineral exporting countries. According to the findings, even the Dutch disease only provides a partial explanation of the growth under-performance of mineral exporting countries. The authors reviewed performance of some mineral exporting countries and found that very few like Indonesia and Oman performed wonderfully more than most mineral exporting countries including Nigeria that underperformed.
From the analysis, it has been concluded that the disappointing growth performance of many mineral rich countries are caused by the combination of endogenous factors such as failure of the resource-rich governments to adopt better policies to promote sustainable growth. Such policies like import substitution industrialisation that reduce the competitiveness of manufacturing sectors and depress agricultural as well as use of minerals windfall for increase in consumption and directing the investment for government sponsored industrialisation that yield very low returns are among the factors that led to poor performance of most of those countries. Some exogenous factors identified have nothing to do with mineral exporting countries such as development history of individual countries.
METHODOLOGY
In this study a vector autoregressive model (VAR) developed by Sims (1980) is used to estimate the dynamic relationships between the time series variable in the study. In this model all the variables are assumed to be endogenous, they depend on their lagged values and the lagged values of other variables in the model. Among the advantages of VAR is its ability to avoid imposing excessive identifying restrictions associated with different economic theories (Eltony and AlAwadi, 2001). The VAR makes little or no theoretical demands on the structure of relationships in the model. By this, the model helps researchers to understand relationship among economic variables (Enders, 1996), so many empirical macroeconomic studies lend support for the model (see Blanchard and Watson, 1984 , Bernanke, 1986 , Iyadi, 2005 . 
As can be observed from the models above, each variable depends on its lagged values and lagged values of all variables in the system. In order to analyse the impact of unanticipated policy shocks on macroeconomic variables in a more convenient and comprehensive way, Sims (1980) proposed the use of impulse response function (IRFs) and forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs). In this study, the IRFs and FEVDs will be used to analyse the impact of shocks in a variable to itself and the other variable in the system.
RESULTS

Data Definition and Source
Data used in this study are sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators and Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, of various issues. The real GDP are in 2005 constant prices, exchange are real exchange rate between naira and the United States dollar. Other data such as agriculture, manufacturing, oil and FDI refers to their respective contributions to real GDP. Table 2 shows the summary of statistics for the series used in the study, all the series but GDP has a very small mean values, from the values of their respective standard deviations, all the series have a very low standard deviations suggesting that they are very close to their mean values. The series are asymptotically normally distributed, except manufacturing output that is not normally distributed. Finally the skewness measures suggest that all the variables are positively skewed, except oil and manufacturing that are negatively skewed. Table 5 shows the result of variance decomposition for the 10-quarters forecast for the contribution of agriculture to real GDP suggest that for the first year 100 percent of variations in Agric can be attributable to itself. However, after 6 years, only 40 percent of variation in Agric can be explained by itself also 30 percent of the variation in Agric and explained by the changes in real GDP. However, about 7 percent of its variation can be explained by fluctuation in real exchange rates and contribution of manufacturing sector to real GDP. The movement in the real exchange rate are generally influenced by changes in itself as well as manufacturing output and contribution of oil to real GDP and to a lesser extent Agric. In the first period of forecast, about 99 percent of the variation exchange rate can wholly attributed to itself. However, by 9 th year only 47 percent of its variation can accounted for by its movements. In that year 20 percent was by manufacturing and 14 percent by oil as well as Agric 9 percent respectively. For the real GDP over the time period, the results show that over 84 percent of the variance in the real GDP is accounted for by the variation in itself. Other variables included in the model that exert an insignificant influence on the behaviour of real GDP are Agric about 6 percent and manufacturing about 4 percent However, for oil rents, apart from itself which accounted for 70 percent in the initial period, however continued to decline subsequently, real GDP capital formation and international oil prices also plays a significant role in its variation. In fact, by 10 th period, the significance of real GDP is the same as that of oil rent. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study examined the effect of oil revenues in the performance of oil rich Nigeria, specifically, the study attempts to establish the likely effects of Dutch disease and resource curse in Nigeria. So many previous studies suggest that most of the resource rich developing countries underperformed in terms of productivity and economic growth. Using long time series data from 1960 to 2011 in VAR model, the study estimates the relationships between real GDP, share of oil rent in real GDP, share of agriculture in real GDP, share of manufacturing output and capital formation in real GDP and movements in naira to dollar real exchange rate respectively.
From the data on structural change in the Nigerian economy during the study period, real GDP, had only performed impressively during the decade 1960 to 1970, however, it continued to swing between 11.16 percent in 1975 and 4.20 percent in 1980. The contribution of agriculture to real GDP declined from 57 percent in 1960 to 26 percent in 2000. However, the decline in the contribution of agriculture was offset by increase in the role of oil, which rose from less than 4 percent in 1960 to more than 41 percent in 2000. However, manufacturing and foreign direct investments did not show any resilience, despite the devaluation of naira in 1986, it maintained a slow growth during the period. Finally, FDI had also maintained a sluggish trend and the TI corruption perception index from 1998 to 2013, suggest that Nigeria is far at the bottom of TI, CPI, lower than most of the African countries like Niger, South Africa and Algeria.
The result of the structural changes in the Nigerian economy is consistent with previous studies on many resource rich developing countries, that oil windfall is more of a curse than blessing for Nigeria. Influx of oil revenues led to not only high level of corruption but also poor macroeconomic policies, like maintaining high exchange rate and protectionist policies that rendered both agriculture and manufacturing less competitive. In addition, the surge in oil revenues created an illusions that it will be sustainable, hence government embarked on spending spree, including massive importation and awards of contracts on white elephant projects and high level of corruption particularly in oil industry. Influx of oil revenues also crowded out labour and investment from agriculture and small scale manufacturing to urban sector, this led to decline in the productivity of agriculture.
Although one may not rule out the likely presence of Dutch Disease in Nigeria during period from early 1970s to 2011, particularly, if we observe how the productivity of agriculture declined unprecedentedly in favour of natural resource sector. The Dutch Disease is likely caused by policy failures, such as lack of coherent and consistent policies to diversify the economy away from Agriculture as well as high level of corruption and unsustainable spending spree successive government embarked on since oil boom era.
Looking at the result of VAR and Variance decompositions suggest that most of the variables included in the estimation helped to predict the movements or shock in other variables, particularly after five periods, suggesting that they are all related.
